Conquering the South Pole
Roald Amundsen was a Norwegian explorer who, in 1906, had become famous for being the first to sail the Arctic's legendary Northwest Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In 1911 he was at the opposite end of the world, in the Antarctic, aiming for the most prestigious prize the world of exploration still offered: the South Pole. His diary entry for 12th September of that year read: 'Not much visibility. Nasty breeze from South. -52°C. The dogs clearly affected by the cold ... prospect of milder weather doubtful.'
Planned with characteristic attention to detail, this bold venture was also the result of coincidence. Two years earlier Amundsen had been immersed in plans to go to the North Pole, when he received news (later contested) that the American Robert Peary had already claimed that Pole. At that instant, Amundsen recalled later, 'I decided on my change of front to turn and face to the South.' As Amundsen reckoned, if he won the South Pole, fame as well as financing of future exploration would be secure.
Winning the South Pole, however, was not to be taken for granted. Also heading south was the well-advertised British Antarctic Expedition, under the command of Captain Robert Falcon Scott. Amundsen was keenly conscious of his rival; tormented by the prospect that Scott might beat him, Amundsen acted too soon, starting off with his team in September 1911, before the arrival of polar springtime and manageable weather. The result was frostbite on the feet of his men that would require a month to heal. Four days after his premature start Amundsen assessed his party's situation dispassionately, and made the decision to return and wait for a time so as not to risk lives.
This false start is a reminder that there is no such thing as an inevitable outcome in the risky enterprise of polar exploration. Methodical and careful, Amundsen was also a man of towering ambition, with dreams and impulses that drive all explorers to risk their lives in wild places. Amundsen's greatness is not that he lacked such driving forces, but that he mastered them. The ability to regain and maintain perspective in the pursuit of a personal dream is a rare asset. Like other great explorers, Amundsen knew when to turn back.
They began the journey for a second time on October 20. Ahead, across unknown terrain, lay a difficult hike over (and occasionally into) crevasses*, around the abysses and ice of the Queen Maud Mountains, and onto the Polar Plateau, through unpredictable weather. Yet without any major incident, on December 14 1911 the Norwegians reached their goal, the geographical South Pole, on schedule.
Before leaving their temporary camp at the South Pole, Amundsen left a letter for Norway's King Haakon VII on special notepaper he had brought, which also contained 'a few words to Scott, who I presume will be the first to come here after us'. The letter ensured a report of his success in the event of some disaster, and was an elegant way of telling Scott, 'I won'. Scott's honorable safeguarding of this letter would be the proof of Amundsen's success. On their return, the men abandoned surplus food, some of which was gratefully collected by Scott's party, and early on January 26, 1912, the polar victors arrived back to their base. 'Good morning, my dear Lindstrom,' Amundsen greeted his startled cook. 'Have you any coffee for us?'
The contrast between what Apsley Cherry-Garrard, the chronicler of the British expedition, called Amundsen's 'business-like' operation and Scott's 'first-rate tragedy' highlights issues that still concern adventurers and explorers today. Amundsen traveled with four sledges loaded with supplies, each weighing 880 pounds and pulled by 13 dogs. He and his four companions traveled behind the sledges on skis, a skill at which the Norwegians were adept. Scott, however, only took a few dogs. Instead he used ponies for transporting supplies, but these had to have food carried for them and had difficulty coping with the sub-zero temperatures. His most expensive investment was three motor sledges, but these required fuel, and it soon became apparent that the team were unable to carry out the necessary maintenance to fix them when they broke down. Scott was not a proficient skier, so he and his men had to walk, and for much of the way they were pulling their own sledges.
Amundsen was also better prepared in the way he organized the depots of supplies left at regular intervals on their journey to the South Pole, ready to be picked up on their return. He used lines of flags at regular intervals together with piles of stones so there was no danger of missing the food depots. As well as having more depots than Scott, he also left three times the amount of food Scott did in depots; Scott badly underestimated the amount of calories that would be needed in these conditions and the rations provided were deficient in vitamins B and C, meaning the men became increasingly malnourished and weak.
At root, though, the contrast between Amundsen and Scott is not about details of management but broad outlooks. 'In Norway there is very little tolerance for failure in expeditions,' one historian says. 'You go and you come back whole.' The British, in contrast, emphasized the struggle, believing that character, not skill, would win out in the end.
* crevasses: deep open cracks on the surface of the ice